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This research provides a multidimensional approach to predicting unethical or prosocial 
behavior by identifying the underlying factor structure of 35 well-established scales linked to 
moral behavior.  A novel measure of whether moral values have inherent meaning (Heavy-Light) 
was also included.  Over 400 participants completed all 36 scales.  Factor analysis yielded 6 
factors: moral agency, dogmatism, empathy, avoidant emotionality, lightness, and moral 
reductionism.  Using multiple regression, the 6 factors along with the Big 5 traits were tested as 
predictors of self-reported unethical behaviors and a single item measure of prosocial donation.  
moral agency, dogmatism, and moral reductionism negatively predicted unethical behavior, 
whereas empathy positively predicted prosocial donation.  Additionally, dogmatism served as a 
negative predictor of prosocial donation.  As a final step, a 105-item short-form measure of the 6 
factors was created by selecting 3 items from each of the 36 scales.  Both the long-form and 
short-form factor models explained more variance than the Big 5 personality traits in unethical 
behavior and prosocial donation.  With further validation, this short-form moral mosaic may be 
useful as a multidimensional predictor of moral behavior.  




The Moral Mosaic: Characteristics Predict Likelihood of Personal Ethical Decisions and 
Prosocial Behavior 
One of the fundamental truths of social science is that influencers of human behavior do 
not exist in isolation.  A vast array of stimuli and emotions are at work in the daily life of an 
individual and it is difficult to attribute their actions to one variable.  Personality traits, emotions, 
and influences come with additional associated personality traits, emotions, and influences.  
However, when it comes to predicting moral behavior, many studies focus solely on the impact 
of highly specific personal characteristics.  Looking across an exhaustive list of these studies, 
typically they investigated the behavioral implications of individual qualities such as guilt, awe, 
empathy, religiosity, or narcissism (Wolf, Cohen, Panter, & Insko, 2011; Dovidio, Schroeder & 
Allen, 1990; Perrin, 2000; Michel & Bowling, 2013; Piff, Dietze, Feinberg, Stancato, & Keltner, 
2015).   
Some researchers may go a step further and investigate if other related characteristics 
mediate or moderate the relationship between a specific variable and moral behavior (Glover, 
Bumpus, Logan, & Ciesla, 1997; Krumrei-Mancuso, 2017; Rua, Lawter, & Andreassi, 2016).  
Whereas the scope of these studies is larger than a single variable approach, it is still limited to 
an isolated set of predictors.  Without offering a comprehensive model of moral predictors, they 
may miss out on the fundamental, underlying motivations behind moral actions.  
 One notable exception is the work of Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, and Kim (2014).  
These authors conducted a latent profile analysis to create three classes of participants based on 
their responses to over 24 broad and narrow traits.  The classes were then used as predictors of 
counterproductive workplace behaviors (CWB) and organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB) 
in regression analyses.  Herein, the class that strongly endorsed measures such as empathic 
concern, guilt-proneness, extroversion, honesty-humility, and moral identity, but weakly 




endorsed shame-withdrawal, moral relativism, and narcissism were most likely to engage in 
OCB and least likely to engage in CWB.  Conversely, those who engaged in the least OCB and 
most CWB belonged to a class that showed the opposite trait endorsement.  However, this 
approach focused on clusters of participants rather than clusters of traits.  As such, traits were 
grouped in a moral or immoral dichotomy.   
The current study, on the other hand, emphasizes the underlying factor structure of a 
broad range of moral predictors.  It seeks to establish a multifaceted approach to moral predictors 
by grouping them together based on their latent factors.  By including associated traits in the 
analysis, a more realistic view of how characteristics promote or dissuade moral actions can be 
realized. Aside from being insightful, this approach is also highly practical.  Herein, by using 
latent factors to as predictors, the need to select multiple possible moderators is greatly reduced. 
This method will also allow a researcher to test broad clusters of moral characteristics when it is 
difficult to predict a priori what scale will be most relevant to predicting a specific moral 
behavior.   
 While this study seeks to rectify a gap in the literature by taking a broader approach to 
moral predictors, it also aims to amend the common approach to moral behavior.  Just as many 
studies use a single measure as a predictor, there is a tendency to define moral behavior broadly 
as voluntary behavior to help another (Patrick, Bodine, Gibbs, and Basinger (2018).  With this 
broad view of prosocial behavior, many studies sought to determine the traits that comprised an 
altruistic personality type (Eisenberg et al., 2002).  However, this approach often distorted the 
impact of certain personal characteristics and failed to consider the power of the situation 
(Patrick et al., 2018).   




Indeed, recent studies have found that moral characteristics differ in the outcomes they 
predict.  Penner and Finkelstein (1998) found that the traits of other-oriented empathy and 
helpfulness differed in the prosocial behaviors they predicted.  Herein, other-oriented empathy 
was predictive of increased time volunteering and increased interaction with HIV-positive 
individuals for male participants, whereas helping behavior was only positively correlated with 
number of volunteer meetings attended for women.  Furthermore, correlational analysis indicated 
that other-oriented empathy was associated with warmth, nurturance, and altruistic motivations. 
Conversely, helpfulness was associated with self-efficacy, confidence, competence, and 
dominance.  These findings show that seemingly similar traits may have vastly different 
underlying motivations that may be expressed in different situations.   
Sometimes context can be so powerful that an otherwise positive characteristic can be 
become a predictor of unethical behavior.  Creativity, for instance, is generally seen as a positive 
attribute, because it is linked to increased organizational performance and greater problem 
solving.  However, Gino and Ariely (2012) found that this trait is also positively correlated with 
self-reported likelihood of committing unethical workplace behaviors and increased cheating 
behaviors.  Even traits that are viewed as overtly moral are not immune to the power of the 
situation.  Although compassion is highly predictive of helping others in need, it also predicted 
graders giving inflated feedback to an individual who wrote a poor-quality essay (Lupoli, 
Jampol, & Oveis, 2017).  Thus, the other-oriented concern of compassion may lead to prosocial 
lying if a person cares more about protecting an individual from negative affect than about 
giving accurate information.  Because moral behavior can take many different forms, it is 
imperative that investigations into this outcome be highly specific.  With this in mind, a long-




term goal of the present program of research will be to create a taxonomy of moral behaviors and 
contexts, showing the behavioral nuances that can result from moral mindsets.   
Personal Characteristics 
Focusing first on the underlying dimensions of characteristics that predict moral 
behavior, this study utilizes 35 established variables that are known or likely predictors, plus 1 
novel measure that assesses belief in the inherent value of moral principles.  Although these 
measures were selected on an ad hoc basis, they are all directly or indirectly related to moral 
behavior.  Below, is a brief outline the measures selected for this study along with their 
associated behaviors.  For sake of coherence, these measures have been loosely grouped into five 
broad categories: self-strategies, philosophical outlooks, self-awareness, ethical judgments, and 
affective states.   
 Self-strategies 
 Self-strategies encompass beliefs about the self and how it interacts with the 
world.  Often these views are based on one’s experiences and behaviors.  As these beliefs 
become incorporated into one’s identity, they form a self-schema.  When an individual is aware 
of their self-schema, it can regulate their behavior and allow it to persist in a broad variety of 
contexts (Froming, Nasby, & McManus, 1998).  Examples of self-strategies include need for 
cognition, self-control, personal need for structure, moral identity, perspective taking, and 
narcissism.  These strategies provide identity and prescribe actions.  For instance, moral identity 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002) represents the importance of moral qualities to an individual and how 
they ought to be expressed.  This can take symbolic and internal forms, in which individuals 
express themselves using moral identifies or privately believe them to be important, respectively.  




Moral identity is associated with increased prosocial acts such as volunteering and social 
involvement across a variety of contexts (Patrick, et al., 2018).  
Need for cognition (NFC) and personal need for structure (PNS) are two opposing self-
strategies used to describe mental processes.  NFC describes the extent to which one desires to 
think deeply and seek out mental challenges.  It allows for greater decision-making abilities and 
heightened moral cognition, which can allow an individual to be more agentic when they react to 
a situation (Strobel, Grass, Pohling & Strobel, 2017).  As such, it has been linked positively to 
self-reported moral behaviors such as donating, helping, and consideration of others, even to 
slightly higher levels than moral identity and empathy.  On the other hand, PNS captures the 
desire to structure and categorize experiences, so as to leave little room for doubt (Thompson, 
Naccarato, Parke &, Moskowitz, 2001). This trait has been linked to less thorough examination 
of information, higher judgmental confidence, and quicker response latencies when making 
decisions (Blais, Thompson, Baranski, 2005).  Societal rules often provide such structure and 
prescribe clearly defined behaviors.  (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).  Therefore, it would be 
predicted that individuals high in PNS would show a preference for following rules and 
guidelines.  
Self-control and narcissism also allow individuals to make choices based on their self-
beliefs, often with very different outcomes.  Self-control encompasses the ability to regulate 
behavior, abstain from counterproductive behaviors, and engage in good citizenship behaviors 
(Zettler, 2011).  It has been linked to higher grades, better adjustment, and lower levels of 
substance abuse (Tangney, Baumeister & Boone, 2004).  Furthermore, Rua, Lawter, and 
Andreassi (2016) found that the relationship between internal moral identity and ethical behavior 
was fully mediated by self-control.  From this, they concluded that self-control is necessary to 




enact ethical desires.  Narcissism, on the other hand, is characterized by a grandiose sense of 
self-importance, entitlement, poor responses to criticism, and exploitative behavior (Raskin & 
Hall, 1979).  This trait is predictive of antisocial behaviors such as counterproductive workplace 
behaviors and dishonest reporting (Michel & Bowling, 2013).  Additionally, McGregor, Nail, 
Kocalar & Haji (2013) found that after receiving praise, those high in narcissism were indifferent 
to the suffering of others.   
Philosophical Outlooks 
Another area from which behavioral prescriptions are derived is one’s philosophical 
outlook.  Common measures of philosophical outlooks include endorsement of free will, 
determinism, and religiosity.  These outlooks are often shaped by one’s culture and traditions and 
serve to shape one’s beliefs, values, and behavioral prescriptions (Nilsson, 2014).   For instance, 
Vohs and Schooler (2008) found that manipulating a deterministic mindset (the belief that 
behavior is wholly the result of genetic and environmental influences), increased cheating 
behavior.  Conversely, Paulhus and Carey (2011) found that belief in free will was linked to a 
greater sense of moral responsibility and stricter morals.  However, belief in free will was also 
associated with demand for harsher punishments after reading a vignette about a wrongdoer.   
Religiosity also can shape a person’s moral behavior, as most faiths include moral 
prescriptions in their doctrines.  For instance, those who attended church and other religious 
activities, believed in an afterlife, and considered themselves born-again Christians were more 
likely to be honest when they had an opportunity to report receiving a higher grade than they 
deserved (Perrin, 2000).  An additional study by Voert et al. (1994) found that regularly-
attending church members showed a stricter moral outlook than those who attended on a 
marginal basis.   




The present research also implements a novel measure related to philosophical outlook, 
highlighting individuals’ beliefs about the inherent value of morals and principles.  Although 
constructs such as moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002) assess the presence of moral traits (e.g., 
kind, honest) in the self-concept, they do not account for the extent to which one believes that 
moral principles are meaningful and important guidelines for behavior.  The present research 
rectifies this gap by introducing the construct of heavy or light perspectives on life.  A heavy 
approach is operationalized as the belief that moral principles matter, and one should strive to 
live up to them.  Those who endorse this approach take life seriously and believe it has meaning.  
Conversely, a light approach was operationalized as the belief that moral principles really do not 
matter and can be compromised to meet everyday goals.  Endorsers of this approach claim to 
view life as a game and believe it is too uncontrollable to contain meaning or purpose.  This 
construct is likely to be a unique predictor of moral behavior because it considers whether one 
feels beholden to a moral code.  As such, someone with a light approach may be entirely 
pragmatic when they act, having little regard for if their behavior fits within moral parameters.  
Unlike someone prone to moral disengagement, a person with a light approach would feel no 
need to justify their actions, as they are of little importance.  
Self-Awareness 
Self-awareness refers to the ability to understand one’s emotions, strengths, limitations, 
values, and motives (Caldwell & Hayes, 2016).  Common measures pertaining to this category 
are self-consciousness, mindfulness, impression management, self-deceptive enhancement, 
intellectual humility, and life-meaning.  According to self-awareness theory, those who engage 
in self-awareness are more likely to evaluate and enact their principles daily (Abbate, Isgrò, 
Wicklund & Boca, 2006).  One such component of self-awareness is the ability to be consciously 




present to the experiences and events that take place in the moment, known as mindfulness 
(Brown, Ryan & Creswell, 2007).  This trait is made up of one’s capacity to describe external 
stimuli, act aware, observe the self, and remain collected under emotionally arousing 
circumstances.  Together, these facets form a cohesive trait that is predictive of emotional 
intelligence, self-compassion, and self-control (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 
2006; Bowlin & Baer, 2011).   
Another aspect of self-awareness is the ability to monitor one’s motives and self-
presentation.  The trait of self-consciousness taps into the abilities in its public and private 
domains.  Private self-consciousness involves cognitive contemplation of the self, while public 
self-consciousness is concerned with the perceptions of their peers (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 
1975).  Glover et al., (1997) found that private self-consciousness plays a moderating role 
between honesty-integrity and self-reported ethical decisions on a series of vignettes.  Aleassa, 
Pearson, and McClurg (2011) found that public self-consciousness was associated with lower 
video pirating when anti-piracy was congruent with attitudes of one’s peers.  Thus, public self-
consciousness appears to be linked with moral behavior when it is congruent with social norms.   
Stemming from public self-consciousness, individuals may inflate their qualities in an 
attempt to have good standing with their peers. Two methods of achieving this are impression 
management and self-deceptive enhancement.  Impression management involves distorting one’s 
responses to fit in with social norms, whereas self-deceptive enhancement is distorting one’s 
responses to appear more skillful (Lalwani, Shrum & Chiu, 2009).  Grant and Mayer (2009) 
found that impression management had a positive interaction with prosocial motives in 
predicting affable citizenship, yet it was not related to prosocial behavior when it could be 
damaging to their reputation.  Self-deceptive enhancement, on the other hand, can take the form 




of moral enhancement (Paulhus & John, 1998).  Herein, individuals high in self-deceptive 
enhancement may exaggerate their moral qualities and downplay their antisocial ones.   
The self-aware individual’s desire to embody their attitudes and values can also serve as a 
motivation to search for and feel life meaning.  The search for meaning in life has been 
significantly linked with the willingness to engage in sacrificial behavior for the sake of others 
(Dugas et al., 2016).  However, high search for meaning has also been moderately linked with 
depression and neuroticism (Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006).  Conversely, the present 
experience of meaning in life is associated with increased volunteerism and charitable donations 
(Klein, 2017).  These individuals display more positive affect, fewer health risks, and tend to be 
more religious.  
Although one can possess a sense of meaning in life from one’s beliefs and values, an 
important aspect of self-awareness is the ability to recognize the limitations of one’s perspective. 
This is accomplished through intellectual humility (Hoyle, Davisson, Diebels, & Leary, 2016).  
According to Krumrei-Mancuso (2017), intellectual humility had a positive relationship with 
altruism, benevolence, and prosocial values when mediated by gratitude and empathy.  
Ethical Judgments 
Before one can behave in an ethical fashion, one must first decide what constitutes moral 
behavior.  As such, ethical judgments provide a value system by which an individual decides 
right from wrong (Nguyen & Bideman, 2008).  Constructs that fit in this category include 
honesty-humility, dichotomous thinking, moral disengagement, and the moral foundations of 
harm, loyalty, fairness, authority, and purity.  These dimensions of ethical judgment are a central 
step in determining if one will follow through with an ethical behavior (Septianto & Soegianto, 




2016).  Once such judgments have been fully internalized, they become a driving force for 
action. 
Two modes of ethical judgment that have profoundly different consequences are honesty-
humility and moral disengagement.  With the advent of the HEXACO, Lee and Ashton (2004) 
added the personality factor of honesty-humility to the established list of Big Five traits 
(Goldberg, 1990).  The honesty-humility factor is described as the dispositional tendency to be 
sincere, honest, faithful, modest, and fair, and serves as an established predictor of prosociality, 
social value orientation, and low cheating behavior (Hilbig, Glöckner, & Zettler, 2014; Hibig & 
Zettler, 2015).  Conversely, moral disengagement is the propensity to divert responsibility from 
the self after committing an antisocial act.  This is typically done through distorting 
consequences, blaming the victim, or making the act seem inevitable (Bandura, Barbaranelli & 
Caprara, 1996).  Moral disengagement positively predicts self-reported unethical behavior and is 
negatively correlated with empathy and moral identity (Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008).  
Moral Foundations Theory posits that individuals base their moral frameworks upon the 
foundations of harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity (Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva 
& Ditto, 2012).  Herein, harm refers to the desire to abstain from behaviors that may hurt another 
and is associated with empathic concern, generosity, and pacifism (Johnson, Hook, Davis, 
Tongeren, Sandage & Crabtree, 2016).  Fairness encapsulates the desire to establish mutual 
beneficence among all individuals and is linked to engagement in social justice egalitarian 
behavior (Johnson et al., 2016).   Loyalty is the belief that alliances need to be made with a 
protective and loyal ingroup established (Johnson et al., 2016).  Authority is the belief that 
adhering to the social hierarchy, obeying authority, and respecting tradition are moral 
obligations.  Finally, purity is the belief that one should not engage in behaviors that are viewed 




as revolting to most of the population and is often associated negative attitudes towards 
nontraditional sexual behaviors (Johnson et al., 2016).  According to moral foundations theory, 
individuals endorse these five domains to varying degrees to create a personal moral framework 
(Graham et al., 2012).  This framework determines what behaviors are viewed as moral or 
immoral and, thus, motivates an individual to act within these guidelines.   
Finally, the rigidity by which one holds ethical judgments also impacts behavior.  
Dichotomous thinking occurs when an individual engages in thinking that is in terms of “good or 
bad,” “black or white,” and “all or nothing” (Oshio, 2009).  These thought patterns allow 
individuals to quickly categorize information and make expedient decisions.  However, it can 
also lead to antisocial outcomes.  For instance, Dichotomous thinking has been associated with 
emotional regulation problems, decreased impulse control, and increased aggression (Oshio, 
Mileda, Mieda, & Taku, 2016).  In fact, Zarkadi and Schnall (2013) found that simply priming 
black and white thinking led to harsher judgments towards drug users or adulterers.  
Dichotomous thinking is also associated with compartmentalization, which has been found to 
predict dishonest behavior (Thomas, 2012; Thomas 2015).  
Affective states 
Affect can also play a large role in determining moral behavior.  The emotions one feels 
in a given situation can encourage or inhibit intervention.  Such affective responses include guilt, 
shame, awe, compassion, empathic concern, personal distress, and optimistic denial. Wright, 
Cullum, and Schwab (2008) state that morally charged attitudes inspire higher levels of 
emotional intensity.  This emotional intensity is then applied to the situation and the target.  
When attitudes are strong, the relationship between attitudes and behavior increases.  As such, 
both trait and state affect can have a strong sway on an individual’s behavior.   




One such affective response is the proneness for guilt or shame.  According to Tangney, 
Miller, Flicker, and Barlow (1996), guilt stems from negative, specific, and unstable attributions 
for one’s behaviors after committing an action that one regrets, whereas shame is derived from 
assigning the negative attribution to oneself in the wake of committing a regrettable action.  
Moreover, guilt proneness is associated with fewer reported unethical business decisions, and 
less aggressive and antisocial behaviors.  The negative behavior evaluation provided by guilt can 
serve as a motivator for reparative action, in which an individual strives to right their wrongs.  
However, when shame becomes great it can motivate an individual to withdraw from others, to 
act more aggressively, and to increase self-reported unethical business decisions (Wolf  et al., 
2011).   
Dispositional positive emotions can also play a large role in motivating one to act in 
prosocial and helpful ways.  Two such emotions are awe and compassion.  Awe is the result of 
rapid attempts to accommodate the experience of novel, complex stimuli (Piff et al., 2015).  This 
entails feeling small in the presence of something greater than the self, which allows one to place 
greater focus on others.  Compassion is used to describe dispositional feelings of concern for 
others and the desire to care for them.  Individuals high in compassion are more likely to engage 
in altruistic helping behaviors, but not punishing behaviors for wrongdoers (Weng, Fox, 
Hessenthaler, Stodola, & Davidson, 2015).  This trend, however, may go so far as to value 
compassionate treatment of the individual over following rules (Lupoli et al., 2017).    
Separate from dispositional affect, one’s emotional state in response to seeing an 
unfortunate other can also serve as a motivating or inhibiting influence.  Two such affective 
responses are empathic concern and personal distress.  As defined by Davies (1982), empathic 
concern is the result of “other-oriented” feelings of concern and care for those in need, whereas 




personal distress is the result of “self-oriented” feelings of anxiety and unease upon seeing 
someone in need.  Those high on empathy displayed a greater likelihood of volunteering to help 
a stranger in need (Dovidio, Schroeder & Allen, 1990).  However, because those high in personal 
distress act out of motivation to relieve their negative affect, they are less likely to help an 
individual if they can easily escape the situation (Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987).  
Another affective strategy emerges when an individual ignores threatening information so 
as to avoid emotionally distressing information. Thompson and Schlehofer (2008b) demark two 
such denial-based strategies.  The first of these is optimistic denial, in which individuals ignore 
potentially harmful information, based on the assumption that such things could never happen to 
them.  The other strategy is avoidant denial, in which an individual avoids harmful information 
in an effort to escape the associated negative feelings.  Individuals who engaged in such denial 
strategies tended to have higher levels of neuroticism and anxiety.  These strategies may also 
encourage less prosocial behavior, as avoiding threatening environments could reduce one’s 
exposure to those in need (Piff, Kraus, Cote, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010). 
Project Overview 
The purpose of the current research is to identify and interpret the unique, latent factors 
that encompass these personal characteristics.  This factor structure, referred to as the moral 
mosaic, should provide a novel approach to predicting and understanding moral behavior.  
Current factor approaches are not well suited to predicting moral behavior.  For instance, the Big 
Five was not associated with deviant computer behaviors or sharing in economic games (Rogers, 
Smoak, & Liu, 2006; Ruch, Bruntsch, & Wagner, 2017).  Although the HEXACO added the 
honesty-humility trait in an attempt to predict moral behavior, the moral choices predicted by 
this factor are limited to those tapping into the honesty-humility component of morality. 




Additionally, while specific moral characteristics can be utilized for predicting moral behavior, 
the literature contains an exhaustive list of them.   As such, it can be difficult for a researcher to 
select the measures to include a priori.  By taking a factor-based approach solely comprised of 
moral characteristics, this study seeks to provide an efficient and broad model for predicting 
moral behavior, through reducing the three dozen aforementioned constructs to a manageable 
number of predictors.    Additionally, building on the work of Penner and Finkelstein (1998), it is 
hypothesized that the type of moral behavior will influence the predictivity of the factors.  
Finally, if the moral mosaic appears to have merit, this study will endeavor to create an efficient 
way of measuring each factor for expedient assessment.   
 In order to accomplish these goals, the present work involved four steps of analysis, 
presented here in four sections. Study 1A establishes the moral mosaic through an exploratory 
factor analysis using a sample of 400 participants.  Study 1B utilizes the generated factors to 
predict moral behavior on 2 sample outcome measures, namely indices of unethical decision 
making and prosocial donation.  Study 1C creates a short-form measure for each factor of the 
moral mosaic.  Study 1D uses the short-form factors to predict the same outcomes as Study 1B, 
so as to compare the predictive power of the two models.   
Study 1A: Establishment of a Factor Model 
 
 The first goal of this study is to identify the factor structure that best represents the 
battery of moral predictors outlined above.  This should establish a multidimensional model that 
identifies moral characteristics on a grander scale than does the single measure approach.  This 
study was exploratory in nature and no hypotheses were generated regarding the underlying 
factor structure.  







Participants were 500 undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology courses at the 
University of Oklahoma over the course of two semesters.  Of those who participated, 449 
undergraduates (333 female) completed the survey and prerequisite mass survey to a degree that 
could be utilized for analysis.  This sample had an average age of 18.70 years (SD=1.56) and 
was 76.2% White, 8.0% Asian, 5.3% Hispanic, 4.5% Black, 4.0% American Indian or Native 
American, 1.8% other, and 0.2% Native Hawaiian. Students volunteered to partake in the study 
in exchange for research exposure credit.  
Measures 
 Because the number of participants available was not guaranteed, 35 measures were 
selected.  This allowed for a minimum of 350 participants in order to keep a ratio of 10 
participants per variable. In doing so, the number of variables were limited in this study. 
Although these measures were selected in an ad hoc fashion, the goal was to select measures that 
are indirectly or directly related to moral behaviors.  To this end, the measures included known 
predictors of dishonest behavior such as scientific determinism, moral disengagement, and 
narcissism (Paulhus, & Carey, 2011; Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008, Raskin & Hall, 1979).  
Traits were also chosen that have been associated with honest and prosocial behaviors such as 
negative behavior evaluation, honesty-humility, compassion, and empathy (Wolf et al., 2011; 
Dovidio, Schroeder & Allen, 1990; Hilbig, Glöckner, & Zeltner, 2014; Weng et al., 2015).  
Other selected traits were more indirectly related to moral behaviors or exhibited characteristics 




consistent with a moral mindset, such as mindfulness, meaning in life, and self-consciousness 
(Brown et al., 2007; Glover et al., 1997; Steger, Frazier,  Oishi, & Kaler, 2006).   
 Listed below are 22 scales which provided 35 measures for the analysis.  To keep the 
number of measurements to a reliable number for the given sample, some closely related 
subscales were either dropped or combined to form a global measure. The scales are listed in 
alphabetical order, and each description includes the number of items, a sample item, and the 
reliability statistic 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1994).  Participants indicated 
the extent they agreed to 40 statements as on a scale of 1(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
Half of the items on this scale measured self-deceptive enhancement, while the other half 
measured impression management.  A sample item for self-deceptive enhancement is “I am a 
completely rational person,” α = .635.  A sample item for impression management is “I always 
obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught,” α = .785.     
Brief Self-Control (Tangney Baumeister, & Boone, 2004).  Participants responded how 
true of them were 13 items on a scale of 1(not at All) to 5 (very Much).  A sample item is “I am 
able to work effectively toward long-term goals,” α = .823.  
Dichotomous Thinking Inventory (Oshio, 2009).  Participants responded to 15 
statements on a scale of 1(strongly disagree) to 6(strongly disagree).  This scale contained three 
subscales, each consisting of five items: preference for dichotomy, profit and loss thinking, and 
belief in dichotomy.  However, profit and loss thinking: “I prefer to classify information as being 
useful or useless for me,” was not analyzed because it’s focus on perception of information and 
lacked the prescriptive implications of the other two subscales.  A sample preference for 




dichotomy item is “It works out best when even ambiguous things are made clear-cut,” α = .711, 
whereas a sample item for belief in dichotomy is “There are only ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in this 
world,” α = .801.   
Dispositional Positive Emotions Scale (Shiota, Keltner, & John, 2006).  Participants 
responded to 38 statements on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  This scale 
measures seven positive emotions: joy, pride, love, awe, content, amusement, and compassion.  
However, the present analyses used only the awe and compassion subscales.  A sample item for 
Compassion is “When I see someone hurt or in need, I feel a powerful urge to take care of 
them,” α = .850.   A sample item for awe is “I feel wonder almost every day,” α = .760.   
 Five Facet Mindfulness (Short Version) (Bohlmeijer, Klooster, Fledderus, Veehof, & 
Baer, 2011).  Participants responded how true of them 24 statements were on a scale of 1 (never 
or rarely true) to 5 (very often or always).  This scale was designed to measure mindfulness 
across the five different facets.  Sample items of the describe facet include, “I’m good at finding 
words to describe my feelings.” Non-react items include “I watch my feelings without getting 
carried away by them.”  Nonjudgment items include “I make judgments about whether my 
thoughts are good or bad,” (R).  Items assessing the observe component include “I notice visual 
elements in art or nature, such as colors, shapes, textures, or patterns of light and shadow.” 
Awareness items include, “I find myself doing things without paying attention,” (R).  For this 
analysis, these facets were combined to form a global measure of mindfulness, α = .778. 
Free Will and Determinism Plus Scale (Paulus & Carey, 2011).  Participants were asked 
to indicate how strongly they agreed with 25 statements on a scale of 1(strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree).  Although this scale measured four outlooks: free will, scientific determinism, 
fatal determinism, and uncertainty, the present study focused on free will and scientific 




determinism, as these two beliefs have been linked to moral behavior.  A sample item for free 
will is “People have complete control over the decisions they make,” α = .714.   A sample item 
for Scientific Determinism is “Your genes determine your future,” α = .614.   
Guilt and Shame Proneness (Wolf, Cohen,, Painter, & Insko, 2011).  Participants were 
asked to rate how likely they would be to behave in the manner depicted across 7 scenarios on a 
scale of 1 (very likely) to 7 (very likely).  Three items were used to measure shame-withdrawal, 
while four items were used to measure negative behavior evaluation (guilt).  A sample item for 
guilt is “You lie to people, but they never find out about it.  What is the likelihood that you 
would feel terrible about the lies you told?” α = .734.  A sample item for shame-withdrawal is “A 
friend tells you that you boast a great deal.  What is the likelihood that you would stop spending 
time with that friend?” α = .684.   
Heavy-Light Measure (Bell & Showers, 2019a).  Participants answered two questions 
assessing if they thought morals and principles had meaning.  The two-item structure of this 
measure was based on numeracy assessment, which also utilizes a 2-item index with good 
validation (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012).  This scale appears in 
its entirety in Appendix A.  
HEXACO (Lee & Ashton, 2004).   Participants endorsed 60 statements, assessing 
honesty-humility, extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness, and emotionality, on 
a scale of 1(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  However, only the 10-item, honesty-
humility component of this scale was analyzed for this section, as the traits representing the Big 
5 were not expected to be relevant to moral behavior.  A sample item for this measure is “I'd be 
tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it,” (R) α = .729.   




Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Short Version) (Ingoglia, Coco, & Albiero, 2016).  
Participants responded how well 16 items described them on a scale of 1(does not describe me at 
all) to 5 (describes me very well).  This scale brief form was utilized questions from the 28-item 
scale originated by Davis (1996).   For this study, fantasy items such as, “When I watch a good 
movie, I can easily put myself in the place of the main character,” were not analyzed, as they 
were not expected to be relevant.  A sample item for personal distress is “In emergency 
situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease,” α = .721.   A sample item for empathic concern is 
“When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them,” α = .765.  
A sample item for perspective taking is “Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I 
would feel if I were in their place,” α = .791.    
 Meaning in Life (Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006).  Participants responded how 
true of them 10 statements were on a scale of 1 (absolutely untrue) to 7(absolutely true). 
Presence of meaning in life and search for meaning in life were measured using five items, each.  
A sample item for presence of meaning is “My life has a clear sense of purpose,” α = .872.  A 
sample item for search for meaning is “I am always searching for something that makes my life 
feel significant,” α = .892.   
Moral Disengagement (Detert, 2016).   Participants responded the extent to which they 
agreed to 12 statements on a scale of 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly disagree).  Moral 
disengagement was based on the four subscales. The moral justification subscale included items 
such as “It is all right to fight to protect your friends.” The euphemistic language subscale 
included “Looking at a friend’s homework without permission is just ‘borrowing it’’.  Items on 
the distortion of consequence subscale included “Teasing someone does not really hurt them.”  
The attribution of blame subscale included “People who are mistreated have usually done things 




to deserve it.”  These subscales were combined to form a global measure of moral 
disengagement for this study, α = .792.    
Moral Judgment Scale (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).  For this measure, 13 items 
were selected that were least politically divisive.  Participants s endorsed these statements on a 
scale of 1(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  Harm was assessed using 3 items, including 
“If I saw a mother slapping her child, I would be outraged,” α = .567.  Fairness was assessed 
using 2 items, including “When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be 
ensuring that everyone is treated fairly,” α = .222.  Loyalty was assessed using 2 items, including 
“If I knew that my brother committed a murder, and the police were looking for him, I would 
turn him in,” α = .164.  Authority was measured using three items, including “When the 
government makes laws, those laws should always respect the traditions and heritage of the 
country,” α = .687.   Purity was assessed using 3 items, including “I would call some acts wrong 
on the grounds that they are unnatural or disgusting,” α = .652.   
Narcissism (short form) (Gentile et al., 2013).   This 13-item scale gave participants two 
options and asked them to choose the statement that most reflected their attitudes.  Three 
subscales were contained in this measure. Items for the leadership- authority subscale included “I 
have a strong will to power.”  The grandiose-exhibitionism subscale included “I like to display 
my body.”  A sample item for the exploitative- entitlement subscale is “I insist on getting the 
respect that is due me.”  These three subscales were combined to form a global measure for 
narcissism, α = .678.    
Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).   Participants responded to 18 statements 
on a scale of 1 (very strong disagreement) to 9 (very strong agreement).  A sample item for this 
scale is “I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems,” α = .899.   




Personal Need for Structure (Thompson, Naccarato, & Parker, 1992).   Participants 
endorsed 12 statements on a scale of 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  A sample item 
for this scale is “I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear,” α = .792.   
Religious Influence (Sethi & Seligman, 1993).  Participants responded to this subscale 
from the religiousness measure by answering 6 questions on a 7-point scale, with varying 
endpoints depending on the question.  A sample item for this scale includes “How much 
influence do your religious beliefs have on the important decisions in your life?” α = .812.   
Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss, 1975).  Participants responded 
to 23 statements on a scale of 1(extremely uncharacteristic) to 5 (extremely characteristic).  
Public self-consciousness was measured using seven items, including “I’m concerned about the 
way I present myself,” α = .777.  Private self-consciousness was measured using 10 items, 
including “I’m constantly examining my motives,” α = .650.  The anxiety subscale of this 
measure was not analyzed, due to its similarity with other measures of anxiety used in this study.   
Self-Importance of Moral Identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002).  Participants read a series of 
moral adjectives: caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, 
and kind.  They then responded to 13 statements about how a person with these characteristics 
should act on a scale of 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  This scale measures two 
components of moral identity.  Items measuring internalization include “Having these 
characteristics is an important part of my sense of self,” whereas symbolization items include “I 
am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these characteristics.”  
These two subscales were collapsed to form a global measure of moral identitity, α = .764.   




 Specific Intellectual Humility (Hoyle, Davisson, Diebels, & Leary, 2016).  Participants 
responded to nine statements on a scale of 1(Not at all like me) to 5 (Very much like me).  For 
this study, human nature was the topic.  A sample item is “My views about human nature may 
change with additional evidence or information,” α = .869.   
Threat Orientation Scale (Thompson & Schlehofer, 2008a).  Participants responded to 
20 statements on a scale of 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree).  Avoidant denial had 10 
items, including “Hearing information about threats makes me more stressed, so I avoid it,” α = 
.868.  Optimistic denial also contained 10 items, including “There is no point in worrying about 
possible threats when they might not even happen to me,” α = .857.    
Procedure 
 Participants enrolled in Introductory Psychology courses at the University of Oklahoma 
during the Fall 2017 and Spring 2018 semesters voluntarily signed up to participate in this single 
session, online study from a list of studies being offered for course credit.  Those who selected to 
take part in this study were emailed a Qualtrics online survey link.  Once participants clicked the 
link and signed the waiver of informed consent, they had 24 hours to complete the study.  
Depending on condition, there were 363-368 items in total, and participants were told that the 
study would take up to 90 minutes to complete 
Across the collection period, this survey took three main forms based on the placement of 
two measures that were not used in the present study.  A measure known as the donna task varied 
slightly across waves and appeared as the fifth measure in waves 1 and 2 and as the final 
measure before demographics in wave 3.  Additionally, the brief mood introspection scale 




(Mayer & Gaschke, 2013) served as the ninth measure in wave 1 but was not included in waves 
2 or 3. The order of measures in each wave can be seen in Table 1.  
  To ensure that the number of measures placed in the online survey was not too taxing for 
participants to answer reliably, some measures were placed in a mass survey session offered to 
the entire research pool in exchange for credit at the beginning of each semester.  This mass 
survey contained the moral identity questionnaire (Aquino & Reed, 2002), the religious influence 
subscale of the religiousness measure (Sethi & Seligman, 1993), dichotomous thinking inventory 
(Oshio, 2009), dispositional positive emotion scale (Shiota, Keltner, & John, 2006), and selected 
questions from the moral justification scale (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).  These measures 
were chosen because they were straightforward, allowing students to respond with little 
introspection.  This would ensure that responses could be accurate, as they completed many 
surveys on various subjects.   
Results 1A 
All 35 measures were factor analyzed, using a maximum likelihood extraction with a 
promax rotation.  Before the factors were generated, a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO = .797) and 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (BTS = 4933.993, p = .000) indicated the data were appropriate for 
such analyses.  The scree plot of this analysis shows that after six factors, subsequent extractions 
approached eigenvalues of one (Figure 1).  Therefore, a six-factor solution was utilized.  
 In this model, Factor 1 contained narcissism (R), honesty-humility, moral disengagement 
(R), dichotomous belief (R), scientific determinism (R), self-control, and fairness.  Factor 2 
contained religious influence, purity, authority, presence of meaning in life, specific intellectual 
humility, moral identity, and loyalty.  Factor 3 contained compassion, awe, harm, empathic 




concern, perspective taking, and search for meaning in life.  Factor 4 contained personal distress, 
low need for cognition, shame-withdrawal, low mindfulness, and avoidant denial.  Factor 5 
contained self-consciousness (R), optimistic denial, low heaviness, and lightness.  Factor 6 
contained self-deceptive enhancement, impression management, free will, personal need for 
structure, and preference for dichotomy.  This six-factor extraction model explained 49.26% of 
the variance and had eigenvalues of 5.199, 3.699, 3.401, 2.337, and 1.599, and 1.500, 
respectively. Table 2 shows the loading for each measure.  
.  To ensure this model adequately fit the data, goodness of fit tests were conducted for 5, 
6, and 7 factor extractions models. Table 3 displays the goodness of fit tests for each model. 
Although the Chi Square value is significant for each extraction model, this is due to the large 
sample size and is not a reflection of model fit.  According to the RMSEA values, the 5-factor 
model adequately fit the data, while the 6 and 7 factor models indicated good fit. Although the 7 
factor model indicated slightly better fit than the 6 factor model, the factors were less 
interpretable. Therefore, the 6-factor model was retained, in congruence with the scree plot. 
Although the 6 factor extraction allows for an interpretable multi-factor solution, results are 
considered preliminary until a confirmatory factor analysis is conducted. 
Discussion 1A 
The purpose of this first step was to identify the latent factors underlying 35 relevant 
measures.  Table 2 displays the results of this analysis.  Collectively, these six factors are 
referred to as the moral mosaic.  Listed below is the name each factor and an interpretation of 
what it represents.  




Factor 1 (Moral Agency).  The first factor was named moral agency because a major 
component of it is taking ownership for one’s actions.  Scientific determinism, moral 
disengagement, narcissism, and dichotomous belief allow an individual to deflect responsibility 
through placing blame on genetics, downplaying consequences, or denigrating the value of 
others.  According to Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, and Pastorelli (1996), when the target of 
an action is dehumanized or made to appear blameworthy, the perpetrator is less likely to feel 
guilt for their action.  Negative loadings of these traits would dictate abhorrence to the thought of 
mistreating others and feelings of guilt upon acting antisocially.  As such, Factor 1 (Moral 
Agency) represents caring about the effect one’s actions have on others and taking responsibility 
for them.  
Factor 2 (Dogmatism).  The second factor was named dogmatism because the 
characteristics that comprise it are indicative of a conservative value structure, with little 
openness to other perspectives.  The relationship between religion and the binding moral 
foundations of authority, loyalty, and purity has been strongly established by previous studies 
established (Graham and Haidt, 2010).  Religions often create communities that are bound by 
beliefs and moral prescriptions.  As such, these communities value group loyalty, respect for 
hierarchy, and reputational purity.  Krumrei-Mancuso (2018) found that religion was associated 
with lower amounts of intellectual humility, however this link was nearly all accounted for by 
authoritarianism.  This value for authority may account for the dogmatic belief that outside 
perspectives are wrong, which would, in turn, give one confidence and purpose.  
Factor 3 (Empathy).  The third factor, named empathy, includes multiple traits that 
represent care for the wellbeing of others.  Variables that load positively on this factor are 
indicative of a drive to help those in need and see things from their perspective.  Empathic 




concern, compassion, and the moral foundation of harm stem from other-oriented feelings, which 
often motivate an individual to intervene on behalf of another (Davies, 1982; Wing et al., 2015; 
Johnson et al., 2016).  As such, putting more focus on the welfare of others, often entails a 
smaller sense of self, which has been associated with awe (Piff et al., 2015).  This smaller sense 
of self is also reflected in the indicators of perspective taking and search for meaning.  
Factor 4 (Avoidant Emotionality).  Avoidant emotionality represents a tendency to 
become easily overwhelmed in the face of difficult stimuli.  Herein, this factor includes the 
components both of emotion suppression and of the tendency to feel negative emotions intensely.   
Although this may seem paradoxical at first, studies have shown that efforts to suppress 
emotions often lead to higher arousal (Pepping, O’Donovan, Zimmer-Gembeck, & Hanisch, 
2014; Wenzlaff & Wagner, 2000).  Additionally, an established link between emotional distress 
and low mindfulness exists (Pepping et al., 2014).   Because mindfulness promotes flexibility in 
the cognitive, affective, and behavioral spheres, those low on it may not be able to find proper 
coping strategies.  Such individuals may be likely to leave situations that could lead to emotional 
distress instead of intervening (Batson et al., 1987).  
Factor 5 (Lightness).  Lightness is indicative of not taking oneself or one’s actions 
seriously.  The two established measures for this factor are low self-consciousness and high 
optimistic denial.  According to Brinthaupt and Lipka (1992), self-consciousness is derived from 
self-awareness and preoccupation with oneself.  As such, low self-consciousness is indicative of 
lower rates of self-thought and introspection.  Not dwelling on the self could lead to a lack of 
clearly defined, guiding morals or principles.  Without inwardly derived rules, one could begin to 
treat life as a game and have no sense of moral expectations to live up to.  This lack of reflection 




on the self is also consistent with optimistic denial, in that a person will not dwell on the 
possibility of bad things happening to them or because of them.  
Factor 6 (Moral Reductionism).  The sixth and final factor, moral reductionsim, 
represents the tendency to simplify information to make it easily interpretable.  For instance, 
PNS and preference for dichotomy are associated with the desire to classify stimuli into clear 
categories (Oshio, 2009; Thompson et al., 2001).  However, the inclusion of self-deceptive 
enhancement and impression management indicate that this classification is not limited to 
outside information. Herein, individuals who endorse moral reductionism may also strive to 
simplify information about themselves, by downplaying their negative characteristics and 
emphasizing their positive ones (Lalwani, Shrum & Chiu, 2009; Paulhus & John, 1998). In doing 
so, an individual may also inflate how much agency they have, which could lead to a greater 
endorsement of free will.  This approach may serve as a coping mechanism as placing oneself 
and external stimuli in neatly defined categories allow one to ignore complicated information.   
Study 1B 
Using the framework created by Study 1A, this study tests the six factors as behavioral 
predictors.  However, the number of measures included in the moral mosaic limited the scope of 
moral behaviors that could be explored.  For this reason, there was room to include only two 
self-report measures of ethicality and prosociality as preliminary outcomes.  Although these are 
not definitive measures, they tap into two distinct domains of morality.  With this in mind, Step 2 
of the analyses had two goals.  First, it investigates the predictiveness of the moral mosaic for 
two distinct contexts - ethical decisions and prosocial behavior.  Secondly, it tests how the 




predictiveness of these six factors compares to the well-known Big 5 characteristics – openness, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotionality.  
 
Moral Behavior  
The first behavioral context is ethical decision making.  In their review of ethics in 
organizations, Treviño, Weaver and Reynolds (2006) define ethical behavior as actions that are 
judged by socially acceptable moral norms.  These actions typically reach a minimal moral 
standard prescribed by the law, a company, or social norm.  Ethicality requires acts of 
commission, such as properly disposing of materials, and acts of omission, such as resisting the 
temptation to steal supplies from the company (Hannah, Avolio, & Walumbwa, 2011).  
Unethical behaviors arise when moral self-regulatory processes are deactivated, and individuals 
give into selfish desires (Detert, Treviño, Sweitzer, 2008).  Such behaviors are often detrimental 
to institutions or other individuals.   
Prosocial behavior, on the other hand, is a subset of ethical behavior that occurs when an 
individual strives to care for and help others in need (Hannah et al., 2011; Eisenberg et al., 2002).  
According to Dunfield (2014), these behaviors rely on three steps.  First, an individual must be 
able to recognize that someone is dealing with a problem.  Second, they must determine the 
source of the problem, and, finally, be motivated to help the other overcome the problem.  These 
behaviors often go beyond adhering to ethical prescriptions and require an individual to go above 
and beyond what is expected.  Dunfield (2014) specifies three subtypes of prosocial behaviors- 
helping, sharing, and comforting.  These behaviors are inspired by seeing an individual in need 
of instrumental need, material desire, and emotional distress, respectively.   





Because the factor structure established in Study 1 A was unknown at the time of data 
collection, this study was exploratory in nature.  As such, three broad hypotheses were formed 
before conducting the present step of the analyses.  First, the factors established by the moral 
mosaic should be relevant predictors of moral behavior.  Secondly, the predictive power of the 
factors should differ across different contexts of moral behavior.  Herein, some factors should be 
more predictive of ethicality while others should be more predictive of prosociality.  Because 
only two moral outcomes were utilized, it was also possible that certain factors could predict 
both or none.  Thirdly, the moral mosaic should explain more variance than the openness, 
conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and emotionality traits, commonly used to 
predict behavior.  However, because they lack a moral focus, it is predicted that they will not be 
able to account for subtle, contextual differences in moral behavior.   
Method 1B 
Participants 
 This study was collected using the same 449 participants described in Study 1A.   
Predictors  
Moral Mosaic Factors.   The six factors obtained in Study 1A – moral agency, 
dogmatism, empathy, avoidant emotionality, lightness, and moral reductionism -- served as 
predictors at this step.  A factor score for each factor score was computed by standardizing the 
respective indicator variables and averaging them together.  Variables that loaded negatively 
onto a factor were reverse scored before standardization.  




 HEXACO (Lee & Ashton, 2004).  The five remaining factors of the HEXACO were used 
as comparative predictors to the moral mosaic for the two outcome variables.  Each factor was 
assessed using 10 items.  A sample item for openness is “I think that paying attention to radical 
ideas is a waste of time,” (R) α = .794.  Items assessing conscientiousness include “I make a lot 
of mistakes because I don't think before I act,” (R) α = .782.  A sample item for extraversion is 
“The first thing that I always do in a new place is to make friends,” α = .779.  A sample item for 
agreeableness is “I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree with me,” α = 
.743.  Emotionality items include “I sometimes can't help worrying about little things,” α = .829.    
 Due to the limitation on number of measures that could be administered, the HEXACO 
factors served as stand-ins for the Big Five Personality Inventory, as these two measures share a 
great deal of similarity with one another (Ashton, Lee, & de Vries, 2015).   The extroversion, 
conscientiousness, and openness factors are largely the same across both scales and can be used 
relatively interchangeably.  However, the HEXACO’s agreeableness and emotionality factors 
exhibit some marked differences from their respective Big Five scales.  For instance, the 
HEXACO form of emotionality removes the anger related components of the Big Five’s 
neuroticism assessment and replaces them with the sentimentality items that were part of Big 
Five’s agreeableness factor.  Conversely, the Agreeableness factor of the HEXACO removes the 
sentimentality component from Big Five’s version and replaces them with low scores on the 
anger-related aspects that are part of the Big Five’s neuroticism scale.  In doing so, the variance 
covered by both scales remains the same, but the focus of the factors undergoes small shifts.  
When comparing these HEXACO factors to their respective Big Five factors, Ashton et al. 
(2015) found that the HEXACO factors of extraversion, conscientiousness, and openness 
correlated with their Big Five counterparts at .74, .70, and .76, respectively.  The Emotionality 




factor of the HEXACO correlated with the Big Five’s neuroticism at .55.  Agreeableness shared 
a correlation of .52 between both scales.  Ruch, Bruntsch, & Wagner (2017) also used these 
facets of the HEXACO as stand-ins for the Big Five in predicting economic game outcomes.  
Outcomes 
 Unethical Decision-Making Questionnaire (Detert, Treviño & Sweitzer, 2008).  
Participants read eight vignettes in which they took the place of an individual who behaved 
unethically.  For each vignette, they responded how likely they would be to engage in the 
behavior depicted on a scale of 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (highly likely).  This measure appears in 
Appendix B.  The eight items were averaged together to form as a measurement of unethicality, α 
= .746.  This yielded a mean score of 3.97 (SD = 1.07).  
 The unethical decision-making questionnaire has been utilized by Piff et al. (2015) as an 
outcome measure in support of their model that awe induction leads to a small self and moral 
behavior.  Additionally, Detert et al. (2008) found that individuals scoring high on this scale 
were more likely to keep money that was not rightfully theirs.   
Donation Scenario (Bozeman, 2015).   The second outcome measure assesses 
participants’ willingness to engage in prosocial behavior.  Participants reported their likelihood 
of donating money to a homeless woman with two children sitting outside a local convenience 
store.   Responses were on a scale ranging from 1 (“very unlikely”) to 7 (“very likely”).  The 
average score for this item was 4.75 (SD = 1.60).   For full text of this measure, see Appendix C.  
This item came from Bozeman (2015) as an outcome measured used to measure the 
prosocial effects of attachment and self-esteem.  It is based on a measure cited in Mikulincer, 




Shaver, Gillath, & Nitzenberg (2005) in which participants read the story of a woman adversely 




No additional data were collected for this study.   The additional measures utilized for 
this study were part of the survey described in Study 1A, using the same participants.   Decision 
Making was the sixth scale appearing in the protocol for the first two waves and the fifth scale in 
the protocol for the third wave.  In each wave, the donation scenario directly preceded unethical 
decision making.   Table 1 shows the order of measures.   
Results 1B 
Unethical Decision Making 
Model 1.  The first regression model utilized for this study entered all six factors 
simultaneously in step 1, with each significant interaction between the factors being entered in 
subsequent steps.  This regression analysis appears in Table 3.  Together, these six factors 
explained approximately 27% of the variance in self-reported unethical decision making, R2 = 
.273, F(6, 442) = 27.67,  p = .000.  Factor 1 (Moral Agency) was the largest, negative predictor 
of unethical behavior, β = -.497, t(442) = 10.90,  p = .000.  Factor 2 (Dogmatism) and Factor 6 
(moral reductionism) also served as negative predictors, β = -.105, t(442) = 2.517,  p = .013; β = 
-.110, t(442) = 2.414,  p = .016. Factor 3 (Empathy), Factor 4 (Avoidant Emotionality), and 
Factor 5 (Lightness) were not significant predictors.  In a second step, one interaction entered 




into the model, ∆R2 = .013, F(1, 441) = 25.243 p = .005.  This interaction, between Factor 2 
(Dogmatism) and Factor 5 (Lightness), wherein those low in dogmatism and high on lightness 
are more likely to behave unethically, appears in Figure 2, β = -.116, t(441) = 2.839  p = .005.    
Model 2.  A second regression analysis tested how the moral mosaic compared to the 
traditional predictors - openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and 
emotionality.  Herein, the moral mosaic factors entered the equation simultaneously in the first 
step, and each significant Big 5 trait entered the equation in subsequent steps.  Significant 
interactions between the moral mosaic factors were then entered.  Table 4 displays this analysis.  
Here, openness entered the equation in step two and explained an additional 0.8% of the 
variance, ∆R2 = .008, F(1, 440) = 24.574, p = .028.   
Model 3. This regression analysis entered all Big Five traits in step 1 and then added each 
significant moral mosaic factors into the regression equation in subsequent steps.. This approach 
controlled for common predictors and revealed the unique contribution of the moral mosaic.  
This regression appears in Table 5.  Step one of this equation explained 10.6% of the variance, R 
2 = .106, F(5, 442) = 10.459,  p = .000. Three factors from the moral mosaic entered into this 
equation as additional predictors. Factor 1 (Moral Agency) entered the equation in the second 
step, ∆R2 = .146, F(1, 441) = 24.698.  p = .000.   Factor 2 (Dogmatism) entered the equation in a 
third step, ∆R2 = .021, F(1, 440) = 23.552, p = .000.  Factor 6 (moral reductionism) entered the 
equation in a fourth step, ∆R2 = .011, F(1, 439) = 21.682, p = .011. 
Donation Scenario 
 Model 1.  Step 1 of this analysis explained 10.8% of the variance in donation likelihood, 
R2 = 0.108, F(6, 442) = 8.906,  p = .000.  Factor 3 (Empathy) was the only positive predictor of 




this behavior, β = .302, t(442) = 5.935,  p = .000.  However, Factor 2 (Dogmatism), served as a 
negative predictor β = -.091, t(442) = 1.960,  p = .051.  No other factors were significant 
predictors.  The second step contained the interaction between Factor 2 (Dogmatism) and Factor 
3(Empathy), β = -.110, t(441) = 2.43, p = .015.  This interaction, wherein those low in dogmatism 
and high in empathy were more likely to donate, explained an additional 1.2% of the variance in 
donation likelihood, ∆R2 = .012, F(1, 441) = 8.562, p = .015.  The third step contained the 
interaction between Factor 1 (Moral Agency) and Factor 4 (Avoidant Emotionality), β = -.097, 
t(440)  = 2.124, p = .034.  This interaction, wherein those high in both moral agency and 
avoidant emotionality were least likely to donate, explained an additional 0.9% of the variance, 
∆R2 = .009, F (1, 440) = 8.115, p = .034.  The fourth step contained the interaction between 
Factor 5 (Lightness) and Factor 6 (Moral Reductionism), β = -.096, t(439) = 2.121, p = .034. 
This interaction, wherein those high in moral reductionism, but low in lightness, were more 
willing to donate, also explained an additional 0.9% of the variance, ∆R2  = .009, F(1, 439) = 
7.771, p = .034.  Table 3 shows the regression results.  Figure 3 plots interactions between 
factors.  
 Model 2. In the first comparative regression, extroversion entered the equation as a 
significant predictor when controlling for the moral mosaic.  This explained an additional 1% of 
the variance for donation likelihood, ∆R2 = .010, F(1, 441) = 8.389,  p = .029.  Table 4 shows the 
results of the regression.  
Model 3.   When entered in the first step, openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, 
agreeableness, and emotionality collectively explained 2.9% of the variance in donation 
likelihood, R2 = .029, F(5, 442) = 2.678,  p = .021.  Empathy was the only moral mosaic factor to 




enter into the equation.  It explained 8.9% of the variance for this outcome, ∆R2 = .089, F (1, 
441) = 9.825, p = .000.  This model appears in Table 5.  
 
Discussion 1B 
 There are notable results when looking at the predictive outcomes of the moral mosaic 
factors.  Factor 1 (Moral Agency), Factor 2 (Dogmatism), and Factor 6 (Moral Reductionism) 
negatively predicted unethical decision making, while Factor 3 (Empathy) predicted donation 
likelihood.  With the negative relationship between moral agency and unethical behavior being 
well established (Hillbig & Ingo, 2015; de Vries & Van Gelder, 2015), it is unsurprising that 
Factor 1 (Moral Agency) would be a significant, negative predictor of unethical decision 
making.  The association between increased rule following and PNS could partially explain the 
link between Factor 6 (Moral Reductionism) and ethical behavior (Blais et al., 2005).  Because 
of the strict moral outlook associated with religiosity, it follows that Factor 2 (Dogmatism) was 
also a negative predictor of unethicality (Voert et al., 1994).  An additional explanation for this 
association is that the binding foundations comprising this factor are associated with 
condemnation of self-control failure (Mooijman, Meindl, Oyserman, Monterosso, & Dehgani, 
2018).   Dogmatism also interacted with Factor 5 (Lightness) as a significant predictor of ethical 
decision making.  Figure 2 shows this interaction, wherein those who highly endorse both 
dogmatism and lightness tend to be less likely to commit unethical behaviors.  Here, it may be 
that those who do not believe in the inherent value of morals may act ethically in order to fit the 
prescriptions of their ingroup. However, the mechanism behind this interaction requires further 
investigation.  




In the context of prosocial donation, Factor 3 (Empathy) was the only positive predictor.  
This result could be expected, as empathic concern is associated with other-focused feelings that 
motivate one to act prosocially (Dovidio, Schroeder & Allen, 1990).  Furthermore, compassion is 
associated with a low desire to punish wrongdoers (Weng et al., 2015).  In this vignette 
participants are told that the woman had a previous criminal record.  However, for those high in 
Factor 3 (Empathy), this information may not be relevant when deciding to donate or not.  
Endorsers of Factor 2 (Dogmatism), on the other hand, may not be so forgiving, as it served as a 
negative predictor of prosocial behavior to the woman.  While dogmatism promotes ethical 
behavior, it may inhibit prosociality towards outgroup members or those deemed unworthy.  This 
result is congruent with Nilsson, Erlandsson, and Vastfjall (2016) who found that the binding 
moral foundations are predictive of lower donations toward charitable causes supporting an 
outgroup.  Empathy and Dogmatism also interact with one another in such a way that low 
endorsement of Dogmatism and high endorsement of Empathy is predictive of prosocial 
donation.  This interaction appears in Figure 3. 
Factor 5 (Lightness) and Factor 4 (Avoidant Emotionality) did not significantly predict 
either behavior.  However, these two factors were involved in significant interactions.  As such, 
the two scenarios tested may not be directly relevant to the two behaviors measured, but 
tangentially interact.  
 In a broad sense, the results of this study support two claims.  First, the findings 
demonstrate that the factors proposed by the moral mosaic are significant predictors of self-
reported unethical and prosocial behavior.  This evidences that the factors are relevant to the 
moral sphere and could possibly serve as a predictive tool for other moral behaviors.  Second, the 
results show that these factors explain over twice the variance in both outcomes than traditional 




measures such as openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and emotionality.  
Although openness and extroversion were significant additions in Table 5, they added no more 
variance than interactions between the moral mosaic factors. 
Study 1C 
 As study 1B demonstrates, the moral mosaic provides significant and unique predictors 
of moral behavior.  However, relying on 22 scales and over 250 items is not a practical way to 
predict behavior.  As such, the goal of Study 1C is to create robust, short-form of the moral 
mosaic that provides reliable and efficient measures of each factor.  
Method 1C 
  This study consisted of three main steps.  First, to create shortened versions of each 
factor, three items were selected from each of the 35 indicator variables used in Study 1A.  The 
goal was to select three items from each variable that were most representative of the measure in 
terms of item-total correlation, without sacrificing the scale’s breadth.  To do this, item-total 
correlations on each measure were calculated.  The item with the highest item-total correlation 
was selected for the short-form measure.   The selected items were removed from their original 
scales and item-total correlations were run a second time.  Once again, the items with the highest 
item-total correlation were selected and removed from their original scales.  This process was 
repeated once more to obtain three items for each predictor indicator variable.  This approach 
should ensure that items tapping into one specific facet of a measure would not dominate the 
short-form assessment.  Second, short form factor scores were created by grouping the short-
form items for each factor together.  The items for each factor were standardized and then 
averaged.  Cronbach’s alphas were calculated for each short-form factor to ensure that they were 




reliable measures.  Finally, correlations between the short-form and long-form factors were 
calculated as a form of validation.  
Results 1C 
 Creation of short-form factors.  By selecting three items from each scale, a short-form of 
the moral mosaic was created that uses 105 items.  The short-form measure for Factor 1 (Moral 
Agency) consists of 22 items and appears in Table 6, α = .811.  The short-form version of Factor 
2 (Dogmatism) consists of 22 items and appears in Table 7, α = .829.  The short-form version of 
Factor 3 (Empathy) comprises 18 items and appears in Table 8, α = .835.  The short-form 
version of Factor 4 (Avoidant Emotionality) is made of 15 items and appears in Table 9, α = 
.796.  The short-form version of Factor 5 (Lightness) contains 11 items and appears in Table 11, 
α = .728.  The short-form version of Factor 6 (Moral Reductionism) contains 15 items and 
appears in Table 12, α = .637.    
Correlations with long-form factors.  Second, comparisons between the factor scores of 
the short-form factors and their respective long-form measures were made.  Table 13 displays the 
correlation matrix between the long-form factors and short form factors.  Short-form and long-
form versions of Factor 1 (Moral Agency) were strongly correlated with one another, r (N = 448) 
= .866, p = .000.  Short-form Factor 2 (Dogmatism) was strongly correlated with its long-form 
counterpart, r (N = 448) = .914, p = .000.  Factor 3 (Empathy) exhibited a strong correlation 
between both forms, r (N = 448) = .971, p = .000.  Short form and long form versions of Factor 
4 (Avoidant Emotionality) displayed a strong correlation with each other, r (N = 448) = .956, p = 
.000.  Factor 5 (Lightness) showed a strong correlation between its long and short versions, r (N 
= 448) = .901, p = .000.  Factor 6 (Moral Reductionism) displayed a highly significant, yet 
moderate correlation between its long and short form factors, r (N = 448) = .661, p = .000   





 This section established a short and practical way of measuring the six factors.  The 
resulting short-forms allow all six factors to be measuring using 105 items, with the majority of 
these displaying good or adequate reliabilities.  Factor 6 (Moral Reductionism), however, had a 
questionable reliability.  This pattern is also displayed in the correlations between the short-form 
factors and the long-form factors, with the first five factors sharing Pearson’s correlations at the 
.85 level or higher.  The correlation of Factor 6 (Moral Reductionism) with its short form was 
lower, but still strong, r (N = 448) = .661, p = .000.  One possible explanation as to why Factor 6 
may be less reliable than the other factors could be that indicator measures for this factor tend to 
be derived from larger scales.  As such, some aspects of the measures comprising this factor may 
be lost in creating the short-form version.  Despite its lower reliability and correlation with the 
full-scale version, the short-form version of Factor 6 (Moral Reductionism) still shows 
reasonable reliability.  Together, these short-form versions allow for a more practical way of 
measuring the factors without sacrificing much validity.  
Study 1D 
After establishing the short-form measures of the moral mosaic factor in Study 1C, the purpose 
of this study was to determine if the predictive power of the short-form factors were comparable 
to the long-form versions as predictors of unethical decision making and donation likelihood.  
Additionally, the predictive power of the short-form scales was compared to the Big Five traits 
of openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and emotionality, as measured by 
the HEXACO (Lee & Ashton, 2004).   This study utilized the method of Study 1B, substituting 
the short-form factors for the long-form versions. 




Method 1D  
 This data came from the survey and participants described in Study 1A.  The short-form 
factors established in Study 1C were used as predictor variables.  Factor scores were calculated 
by standardizing and averaging the items contained in each short-form measure.  Additionally, 
the openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and emotionality facets of the 
HEXACO (Lee & Ashton, 2004) served as comparative predictors.  The unethical decision-
making questionnaire (Detert, Treviño & Sweitzer, 2008) and donation likelihood scenario 
(Bozeman, 2015) served as outcome variables.  
Results 1D 
Unethical Decision Making 
Model 1. The six short-form factors together in step one explained 25.6% of the variance, 
R2   = .256, F(6, 442) = 25.366,  p = .000.  Similar to Study 1B, Short-form Factor 1 (Moral 
Agency) was the largest, negative predictor of unethical behavior, β = -.456, t(442) = 9.878,  p = 
.000.  Short Form Factor 2 (Dogmatism) and Short-form Factor 6 (Moral Reductionism) also 
predicted unethical decision making similarly to their long-form counterparts, β = -.095, t(442) = 
2.116,  p = .035; β = -.121, t(442) = 2.694, p = .007.  None of the other short-form factors was a 
significant predictor in this first step.  The same interaction from the long-form version also 
entered into step 2 of this model, ∆R2  = .013, F(1, 141) = 23.144, p = .006.  This interaction 
between Short-Form Factor 2 (Dogmatism) and Short-form Factor 5 (Lightness) had similar 
predictive power, β = -.116, t(441) = 2.748, p = .006.  Table 14 displays this regression.  
Model 2.  As before, openness entered the equation as a significant predictor in the 
second step.  It explained an additional 1.4% of the variance, ∆R2 = .014, F(1, 440) = 23.303, p = 




.004.  However, in this model, extroversion also entered the equation in a third step and 
explained an additional 0.8% of the variance, ∆R2 = .008, F(1, 439) = 21.144, p = .031.  Table 15 
shows the results of the regression 
Model 3.  Similar to the results of Study 1 B, Short-form Factor 1 (Moral Agency) 
entered the equation in the second step, ∆R 2= .128, F(1, 441) = 22.464,  p = .000.  Factor 6 
(Moral Reductionism) entered the equation in a third step and explained an additional 3% of the 
variance, ∆R2 = .030, F(1, 4440) = 22.546,  p = .000 and Factor 2 (Dogmatism) entered the 
equation in a fourth step, ∆R2 = .016,  F(1, 439) = 21.343, p = .002. This model appears in Table 
16.   
Donation Scenario 
 Model 1.  When the short-form factors were entered simultaneously in step 1, they 
explained 10.1% of the variance, R2 = .101, F(6, 442) = 8.235, p = .000.  As before, Factor 3 
(Empathy) was the only positive predictor, β = .270, t(442) = 5.359, p = .000.  However, Factor 2 
(Dogmatism), was not a significant predictor, along with the other factors.  Only one interaction 
entered the equation, ∆R2 = .017, F(1,441) = 8.392, p = .004.  This second step contained the 
interaction between Factor 1 (Moral Agency) and Factor 4 (Avoidant emotionality), β = -.133, 
t(441) = 2.915, p = .004.  Table 14 displays this regression model.    
  Model 2.  In this model, none of the HEXACO factors reached significance in the second 
step.  As such, this model mirrors Model 1.  It appears in Table 15.   
Model 3.  Congruent with the full-scale version, Empathy entered the equation in the 
second step and explained an additional 7.4% of the variance, ∆R2 = .074, F(1, 441) = 8.482,   p 
= .000.  Unlike the long-form model, Short-form Factor 1 (Moral Agency) also entered this 




equation as a positive predictor of donation likelihood in step 3.  It explained an additional 0.9% 
of the variance ∆R2 = .009, F(1,440) = 8.005,  p = .031.  Table 16 shows the results of this 
regression. 
Discussion 1D 
 This section’s goal was to compare the predictive power of the short-form factors with 
those obtained by the full-scale model.  These two models were highly comparable in their 
predictive power of the two moral outcomes.  As could be expected, the variance explained by 
the factors decreased slightly for the short-form model, but the predictive patterns remained 
largely unchanged.  One notable exception is that the short-form version of Factor 2 
(Dogmatism) was not a significant, negative predictor of donation likelihood.  However, this 
factor was marginally significant in Study 1B.  
 Another interesting difference with the short-form model is that in Table 14, the short-
form version of Factor 1 (Moral Agency) entered the equation in step 3.  This could indicate that 
the short-form version of this model may be more streamlined in predicting prosocial action.  It 
is also possible that the shortened versions of the scales allowed for less overlap, allowing it to 
enter the equation.  Either way, it only explained less than an additional 1% of the variance.  
 The results of this section show that the short-form factors are useful and homologous to 
the long-form factors.  The short-form of the moral mosaic can be used as an efficient and 









Collectively, the results obtained in this study provide initial evidence that the moral 
mosaic serves as a relevant and unique tool for predicting moral behavior.  This factor structure 
explained more variance in unethical and prosocial outcomes than the commonly utilized Big 
Five traits.  Additionally, the short-form version of the moral mosaic allows for expedient 
assessment of the factors without losing much predictive power or explained variance.  Together, 
these findings suggest that the moral mosaic could be a useful addition to the moral psychology 
literature as a novel assessment tool.  
Additional contributions to the literature emerge when looking at specific predictive 
patterns of the factors.  Across the two contexts of unethical decision making and prosocial 
behavior, no factor was a consistent predictor of moral behavior.  This result supports the 
hypothesis that contextual differences matter in determining whether a personal characteristic is 
a moral predictor.  As such, this study furthers the notion that psychological studies should be 
highly specific in the moral outcomes they measure.  
Moral Mosaic Factor Structure 
By utilizing a maximum likelihood extraction with a promax rotation, six underlying, 
latent factors emerged.  Based on their indicator variables (Table 2), appropriate labels are moral 
agency, dogmatism, empathy, avoidant emotionality, lightness, and moral reductionism, 
respectively.  Herein, these six factors represent unique facets of moral characteristics.  
In many ways, Factor 1 (Moral Agency) represents a conventional view of ethicality, as it 
contains low endorsement of overtly antisocial attributes and positive loadings of characteristics 
that represent taking ownership for one’s actions.  Factor 2 (Dogmatism) represents a morality 




built upon conservative values.  As such, an individual who highly endorses this factor would be 
likely to look to the values of their ingroup as the standard for what is right or wrong.  Factor 3 
(Empathy) represents an other-oriented value system.  Herein, those high in this trait focus less 
on their selves and are moved to commit moral deeds out of concern for others.  Factor 4 
(Avoidant Emotionality) indicates a tendency to become overwhelmed at distressing stimuli.  As 
such, individuals who endorse this trait may avoid difficult situations that could lead to undesired 
emotions.  Factor 5 (Lightness) represents a predisposition of not taking oneself seriously.  
Individuals high on this trait tend to care little about their motives or how they are perceived, as 
they believe values and principles hold no value.  Factor 6 (Moral Reductionism) represents the 
desire to simplify stimuli into easily interpretable segments.  This desire extends to the self, as 
such individuals like to think of themselves in simple, often positive terms.  
Moral Mosaic Factors as Predictors 
Using these factors as predictors for two separate forms of moral behavior reveals two 
major findings.  First, these factors explain more variance in the measured moral behavior than 
traditional measures of openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and 
emotionality.  Second, analyses show that these factors not only differ in their predictive power 
across scenarios, but that some may even become antisocial predictors in varying situations.   
When looking at unethical behavior, the six factors comprising the moral mosaic 
accounted for over twice the variance explained by openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, 
agreeableness, and emotionality.  Factor 1 (Moral Agency), Factor 2 (Dogmatism), and Factor 6 
(Moral Reductionism) were negative predictors of unethical behavior.  While it is not surprising 
that these factors predict ethical behavior, their reasons for promoting this behavior may be 




vastly different.  As such, Factor 1 (Moral Agency) may promote ethical decision making out of 
a strong aversion to feeling guilty, while Factor 6 (Moral Reductionism) may promote it through 
following prescribed behaviors, and Factor 2 (Dogmatism) through communal moral values.  
Additionally, these factors explained more than three times the variance as openness, 
conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and emotionality in donation likelihood, but they 
did so in a different pattern.  Here, Factor 3 (Empathy) was a positive predictor of willingness to 
donate to a homeless woman, while Factor 2 (Dogmatism) was a negative predictor.  This result 
shows that different circumstances can influence which moral qualities motivate one to moral 
action, or the lack thereof.  Interestingly, whereas Factor 2 (Dogmatism) may motivate 
individuals to make ethical decisions, it may also nudge them away from donating money to 
someone whom they see as undeserving.  One possible reason for this shift in behavior could be 
that homeless individuals may be viewed as acting outside the authority and purity moral 
foundations, as they do not fit into the typical societal hierarchy and are often viewed as 
unkempt.  This clearly marks them as an outgroup member.  Preston and Ritter (2013) found that 
priming participants with the term “religion” promoted ingroup-serving behaviors but not 
outgroup ones.  Conversely, they found that primes of “God” led to increased prosociality 
towards outsiders.  One explanation offered is that “religion” makes individuals think 
communally, while “God” makes individuals think more independently about their behavior.  
Because Factor 3 (Dogmatism) consists of mainly binding moral foundations, it would follow 
that these individuals’ values are more group-minded in their moral behavior.  
 
 





While the results of this study appear robust, some errors occurred during the study that 
are worth noting.  Most of these are centered on the scales utilized for analysis.  For instance, the 
heavy-light measure underwent small changes to auxiliary words in the definitions of light for 
the second and third waves.  This is noted in Appendix A. Additionally, one item was 
accidentally removed from the shame-withdrawal facet of the GASP scale.  This item was “Your 
home is very messy and unexpected guests knock on your door and invite themselves in.  What 
is the likelihood that you would avoid the guests until they leave?” As such, the shame- 
withdrawal facet was assessed using three items instead of four.  This may have slightly 
decreased the reliability of the measure.  Similarly, one item from the five-facet mindfulness 
questionnaire was not included in the survey.  This item was “Generally, I pay attention to 
sounds, such as clocks ticking, birds chirping, or cars passing.”  
Additionally, results for the unethical decision-making questionnaire differed 
significantly across waves, F(2, 446) = 4.746, p = .009.  Herein, unethical decisions for 
participants in wave 2 (M= 4.269, SD = .988) were significantly higher than they were for 
participants in wave 1 (M = 3.876, SD = .1.01) and wave 3 (M = 3.922, SD = 1.189).  Although 
it is possible that this difference could be due to changes in order of measures, this result could 
also be due to sample differences across semesters.  Additionally, wave 2 had a smaller sample 
than waves 1 or 3.  
 
 





The moral mosaic serves as a preliminary foray into the various underlying mechanisms 
behind a host of moral attributes.  From the foundation laid by this study, there are several 
different directions which can be explored.  Three general areas that can be improved upon are 
the inclusion of more personal characteristics, the testing of more behavioral outcomes, and the 
inclusion of more diverse samples.  
Additional Personal Characteristics 
Whereas this study utilized 35 unique characteristics for factor analysis, this number only 
scratches the surface of the moral attributes defined in psychological research.  Herein, there is 
much room to explore.  Some factors, such as Factor 1 (Moral Agency) and Factor 2 
(Dogmatism) are made up of a large number of attributes, whereas others, such as Factor 5 
(Lightness) are made up of relatively few attributes. One beneficial next step would be to flesh 
out the established factors by including more attributes into the factor analysis.  In doing so, a 
greater picture of some smaller factors could be utilized.  For instance, philosophical outlooks 
(such as moral nihilism) may load with Factor 5 (Lightness) and self-structures (such as need for 
closure) might load onto Factor 6 (Moral Reductionism).  
Additionally, the two-item heavy-light measure used here had low internal reliability. A 
10-item form of this measure isolates each component of the heavy-light definitions as an 
individual item.  This multiple-item measure is being validated in ongoing studies (Bell & 
Showers, 2019b).  This format permits participants to endorse or decline aspects of each 
approach and will allow researchers to compare the reliability of the multiple-item and two-item 
formats.  The multiple-item version of the Heavy-Light Scale appears in Appendix D. 





One shortcoming of this study is the limited size and scope of moral outcomes measured.   
Due to these constraints, only two self-reported behaviors were assessed.  Although these 
measures yielded interesting results, they could not assess moral behavior to the depth that it 
deserves.  The six factors comprising the moral mosaic should indeed have unique qualities that 
would motivate an individual to act morally in some contexts and inhibit them in others.  
However, by focusing on unethical decision-making and donation likelihood, the predictive 
power of all the factors likely was not revealed, as these two behaviors were largely explained by 
Factor 1 (Moral Agency) and Factor 3 (Empathy), respectively.  
 In order to remedy this problem, a more elaborate taxonomy of moral behavior needs to 
be established that identifies behaviors that are sensitive to the remaining 4 factors. For instance, 
Factor 2 (Dogmatism) may be highly predictive of showing kindness to an individual with whom 
one shares similarity, but not to an individual who is of an opposing belief system.  As such, 
studies that target ingroup and outgroup morality would be worth investigating.  
Factor 4 (Avoidant Emotionality) may influence one to act in an antisocial manner in 
many contexts.  For instance, this factor could be associated with escaping distressing situations 
instead of helping.  Additionally, this factor could influence individuals to act antisocially if they 
were experiencing negative emotion, as they may have problem regulating their feelings and 
finding creative ways to deal with them.  
 Factor 6 (Moral Reductionism) could be associated with prosocial and ethical action 
when it is clear cut and the social norm.  However, self-deceiving individuals may not have the 
resources to act prosocially when the situation is unclear, or the behavior is frowned upon.  This 




trait may also allow individuals to ignore or downplay their antisocial behavior, as 
acknowledging it would complicate their self-image. 
 Factor 5 (Lightness) could predict a lack of regard for the consequences of one’s actions.  
One may see morality as an external tool to get what one wants, without feeling beholden to 
moral standards when they are no longer useful.  As such, this factor could predict cheating for 
personal gain or even Machiavellian behavior (Jones & Paulhus, 2017).  
Sample Diversity 
It is worth noting that a disproportionate majority of the participants in this study were 
female.  Possible sex differences may influence the factor structure of the moral mosaic.  For 
instance, females tend to be more relational, empathic, and emotional than males (Eisenberg et 
al., 1994).  However, with the current sample size, there are not enough participants to compare 
differences between the sexes in the factor structure.  A valuable future study could draw on a 
larger population to investigate these differences, if any.  
Additionally, this study was performed at a university in a largely conservative area of 
the United States.  It is possible that conservative ideology may also alter the factor structure of 
the moral mosaic.  Whereas the moral foundations of purity, authority, and loyalty are highly 
endorsed by conservatives, they are not generally endorsed by liberals.  Herein, Factor 2 
(Dogmatism) may be constructed differently in largely liberal areas, as liberals would not view 
these values as overtly moral.  This could lead to some indicator variables from that factor (such 
as moral identity and presence of life meaning) to change factors.  A valuable future study could 
repeat this procedure with an overtly liberal or diverse sample to see if any differences appear.  





 To summarize, these data demonstrate that a factor-based approach to predicting moral 
behavior has great merit.  The moral mosaic provides a more holistic approach to predicting 
moral behavior than single measure approaches, by grouping associated traits together.  Through 
this broader lens, attributes are not viewed in a prosocial or antisocial dichotomy, but as nuanced 
characteristics with variable strengths and weaknesses.  Herein, factors that were negative 
predictors of unethical decision-making did not positively predict prosocial donation.  Factor 2 
(Dogmatism), even flipped as a moral predictor in the context of ethicality, but as an antisocial 
predictor in the prosocial donation scenario.  
 Although the results of this study are intriguing, they are just the first step in creating a 
more detailed moral taxonomy.  A host of personality traits and moral outcomes are worth 
investigating and incorporating into this model.  In doing so, a more objective view of moral 
motivations can be realized.   The definition of morality is constantly changing, adapting, and 
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Generally speaking, is your approach to life HEAVY or LIGHT? Please read the definitions below and then indicate your answers. 
People who take a HEAVY approach take life seriously.  They hold important values and principles and believe it is important to live 
up to them.  They believe that life can have meaning and purpose and that an individual’s values and principles matter. 
 
People who take a LIGHT approach view life as a game.  They believe that values or principles may need to be compromised to meet 
everyday goals, and that life is often too uncontrollable for it to have meaning or purpose.  Because of this, an individual’s values and 
principles don’t always matter. 
 
1. Compared to the average person, would you say your approach to life is HEAVY or LIGHT? (choose one) 
 My approach to life is LIGHT compared to the average person  
 My approach to life is HEAVY compared to the average person 
     2. Now, without comparing yourself to others, to what extent is your approach to life HEAVY or LIGHT? 
                   1                   2                  3                  4                   5                  6                  7 
(almost always HEAVY)                   (neither HEAVY nor LIGHT)                (almost always LIGHT) 
 
Note.  An early iteration of the measure taken by participants in wave 1 defined lightness as the following: 
People who take a LIGHT approach view life as a game.  They believe that values or principles may need to be compromised to meet 
everyday goals, and that life is often too uncontrollable for it to have meaning or purpose.  Because of this, an individual’s values and 
principles don’t always matter. 
 
 





Unethical Decision-Making Questionnaire (Detert, Treviño & Sweitzer, 2008) 
How likely is it that you would do the behavior described? 
1                   2                  3                  4                   5                  6                  7 
    (not at all likely)                          (about 50% likely)                                     (highly likely) 
1.  You work in a fast-food restaurant in downtown Norman.  It’s against policy to eat food without paying for it.  You came straight 
from classes and are therefore hungry.  Your supervisor isn’t around, so you make something for yourself and eat it without paying. 
2.  You work as an office assistant for a department at the University of Oklahoma.  You’re alone in the office making copies and 
realize you’re out of copy paper at home.  You therefore slip a ream of paper into your backpack. 
3.  You’re preparing for the final exam in a class where the professor uses the same exam in both sections. Some of your friends 
somehow get a copy of the exam after the first section.  They are now trying to memorize the right answers.  You don’t look at the 
exam, but just ask them what topics you should focus your studying on. 
4.  You’ve waited in line for 10 minutes to buy a coffee and muffin at Starbucks.  When you’re a couple of blocks away, you realize 
that the clerk gave you change for $20 rather than for the $10 you gave him.  You savor your coffee, muffin and free $10. 
5.  You get the final exam back from your professor and you notice that he’s marked correct three answers that you got wrong.  
Revealing his error would mean the difference between an A and a B.  You say nothing. 
6.  Your accounting course requires you to purchase a software package that sells for $50.  Your friend, who is also in the class, has 
already bought the software and offers to lend it to you.  You take it and load it onto your computer. 
7.  Your boss at your summer job asks you to get confidential information about a competitor’s product.  You therefore pose as a 
student doing a research project on the competitor's company and ask for the information. 
8.  You are assigned a team project in one of your courses.  Your team waits until the last minute to begin working.  Several team 
members suggest using an old project out of their fraternity/sorority files.  You go along with this plan. 
Note. Results for wave 2 differed significantly from waves 1 and 3, F(2, 446) = 4.746, p = .009.                                                        
wave 1 (M = 3.876, SD = .1.01); wave 2 (M= 4.269, SD = .988); wave 3 (M = 3.922, SD = 1.189). 





Donation Likelihood (Bozeman, 2015) 
 
A homeless woman and her two children are sitting outside of a local convenience store with a sign asking for donations. Times have 
been hard for the woman and her children, and you know she relies on the donations she receives from others in order to provide for 
her children. You also happen to know she has a past criminal record. 
How likely would you be to donate money to this woman? 
1                   2                  3                  4                   5                  6                  7 








Note. A follow up question not analyzed for this study stated:  
Imagine you have a pocket full of dollar bills and coins totaling about $5. How much money would you be willing to donate to this 
woman?  
This item was not utilized because the open response nature allowed participants to answer “I would give her food”.                                                          
Responses to the Donation Likelihood item did not differ significantly across waves, F(2, 446) = .007, p = .993.                               
wave 1 (M = 4.740, SD = 1.641); wave 2 (M= 4.740, SD = 1.350); wave 3 (M = 4.760, SD = 1.690). 





Revised Heavy-Light Scale for Future Studies 
1                       2                     3                     4                      5                   
                           (completely disagree)                        (neither agree nor disagree)                    (completely agree) 
 
1. It is important that my relationships with others are sincere. 
        
2. Life seems too uncontrollable to have purpose or meaning. 
        
3. I believe that my morals and principles matter, and I strive to live up to them. 
        
4. I believe that life can have purpose and meaning. 
        
5. All in all, the world is indifferent to the moral choices we make. 
        
6. My general approach to life is a serious one, with important values and principles 
        
7. People who act according to their principles can make a difference in the world. 
        
8. I see life as a game, in which morals and principles don’t always matter. 
        
9. Most human relationships involve some kind of ulterior motive. 
        










Placement of Measures for Each Wave of Data Collection 
Note.  Donna Scenario had participants read the story about a woman whose careless action created a fatal fire. Participants were 
either assigned to argue why she was responsible, why she was not responsible, a combination of both, or write an essay about if 
she was responsible.  






























Goodness of Fit Tests Comparing Number of Factors for EFA Model 
 
 
Note. *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 N= 449 df= degrees of freedom.   RMSEA= root mean square error approximation.  
RMSEA 90% CI=  root mean square error  approximation 90% confidence interval.  
 
  








*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < 001 
Note. N=449. All factors were entered in step 1 and each significant interaction was entered in subsequent steps with a criterion of 
p ≤ .05. 
Table 4. 
Long-form Factor Scores: Regressions Predicting Unethical Behavior or Prosocial Donation 






*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 
Note. N=449 All factors were entered in Step 1.  Each significant Big Five trait, as measured by the HEXACO (Lee & Ashton, 
2004) was entered in subsequent steps, and each significant interaction between the 6 factors was entered as a final step.  All 
additions had a criterion of p ≤ .05.  
Table 5. 
Regressions Predicting Unethical Decisions or Prosocial Donation: Long-form Factors with Significant Big Five Traits Entered  




















  *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 
Note. N=449 Big Five traits, as measured by the HEXACO (Lee & Ashton, 2004) were entered in Step 1, and each significant 
Moral Mosaic Factor was entered in subsequent steps with a criterion of p≤.05.  
Table 6. 
Regressions Predicting Unethical Decisions or Prosocial Donation:  Big Five Traits with Significant Long-form Factors Entered  

























Note. N=437. (R) indicates that a value was reverse scored.  
GASP = Guilt and Shame Proneness. DTI= Dichotomous Thinking Inventory.  FAD+= Free Will and Determinism Plus.  
Cases with missing values were excluded listwise. Citations for the scales appear in Table 2. 
Table 7. 
 Selected Items Used to Create Short-form Factor 1: Moral Agency (S1: Moral Agency) 


























 Selected Items Used to Create Short-form Factor 2: Dogmatism (S2: Dogmatism) 
Note. N=435. (R) indicates that a value was reverse scored cases with missing values were excluded listwise. Citations for the scales appear in 
Table 2. 





Note. N=445. (R) indicates that a value was reverse scored.  
 DPES= Dispositional Positive Emotions Scale. IRI= Interpersonal Reactivity Index.  
 Cases with missing values were excluded listwise. Citations for the scales appear in Table 2. 
Table 9. 
 Selected Items Used to Create Short-form Factor 3: Empathy (S3: Empathy) 




   
Note. N=445. (R) indicates that a value was reverse scored. 
 IRI= Interpersonal Reactivity Index. FFMQ= Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire.  GASP= Guilt and Shame Proneness.  
TOS= Threat Orientation Scale.   
Cases with missing values were excluded listwise. Citations for the scales appear in Table 2. 
Table 10. 
 Selected Items Used to Create Short-form Factor 4: Avoidant Emotionality (S4: Avoidant Emotionality) 






Note. N=448.  (R) indicates that a value was reverse scored.  
 TOS= Threat Orientation Scale. 
 Cases with missing values were excluded listwise. Citations for the scales appear in Table 2. 
Table 11. 
 Selected Items Used to Create Short-form Factor 5: Lightness (S5: Lightness) 





   
Note. N=440. (R) indicates that a value was reverse scored. 
 BIDR= Balanced Inventory of Desired Reporting. FAD+= Free Will and Determinism Plus. DTI= Dichotomous Thinking Inventory.   
Cases with missing values were excluded listwise. Citations for the scales appear in Table 2. 
Table 12. 
 Selected Items Used to Create Short-form Factor 6 (Moral Reductionism) 






Table 13.  
Pearson Correlations between Long-form and Short-form Factors, Big Five Traits, and Self-reported Unethical Decisions and 
Prosocial Donations 
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 
Note. N=449 for all correlations.  Unethical Decision Making is measured using the Unethical Decision Making Questionnaire 
(Detert, Treviño & Sweitzer, 2008). Donation Likelihood is measured from the Donation Scenario (Bozeman, 2015).  Citations for 
all other scales appear in Table 2. 
 






*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 
Note. N=449. All short-form factors were entered in step 1 and each significant interaction was entered subsequently with a 
criterion of p ≤ .05. 
 
Table 14. 
 Short-form Factor scores: Regressions Predicting Unethical Behavior or Prosocial Donation 






*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 
Note. N=449 All short-form factors were entered in Step 1.  Each significant Big Five trait, as measured by the HEXACO (Lee & 
Ashton, 2004), was entered in subsequent steps, and each significant interaction between the six short-form factors was entered as a 
final step. All additions had a criterion of p ≤ .05.  
Table 15. 
Regressions Predicting Unethical Decisions or Prosocial Donation: Short-form Factors with Significant Big Five traits entered  






Note. N=449 Big Five traits, as measured by the HEXACO (Lee & Ashton, 2004), were entered in Step 1, and each significant short-form 
factor was entered in subsequent steps with a criterion of p ≤ .05.  
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 
Table 16: 
Regressions Predicting Unethical Decisions or Prosocial Donation:  Big Five Traits with Significant Short-form Factors Entered  






Figure 1. Scree Plot of Eigenvalues from Maximum Likelihood Factor Analysis with 
a Promax Rotation 






Figure 2. Interaction Between Dogmatism and Lightness in Predicting Unethical Decision Making  







Figure 3. Donation Likelihood Interactions. 
 Figure 3A depicts the interaction between F3: Empathy and F2: Dogmatism. Figure 3B depicts the interaction between F1: Moral 
Agency and F4: Avoidant Emotionality Figure 3C depicts the interaction between F6: Moral Reductionism and F5: Lightness 
